The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.
Since 2023 the Houthis have harassed ships exiting and entering the Suez Canal but sunk few vessels. Well-trained American and allied surface combatant crews have intercepted scores of missiles and drones, and U.S. Navy strike fighter squadrons have bombed Houthi missile launch sites. Nevertheless, insurance premiums for the Suez route have increased, and the Suez Canal Authority has lost almost 70% of its shipping traffic despite lower transit fees.
The number of ships in the Navy has shrunk since its Trump administration high of 296 and, as per construction and procurement funding, won’t reach more than 300 ships until 2032. Maintenance and repair delays have piled up rapidly. Only 60% of the attack submarine fleet is deployable at any given time. The rest is tied up in maintenance. Two supercarriers are out for an additional year-plus due to unspecified turbine damage. The U.S. is retiring surface warships faster than it can build them. Its new ships, most notably the Constellation class frigates, carry half the firepower of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer at around two-thirds of the price. The Navy has also struggled in vain for nearly two decades to retain talent.
Sea control is nonnegotiable for a dominant maritime power. The U.S. needs to deploy its forces from North America and shift them between different parts of Eurasia. If it can’t maintain a strong naval presence, it will be forced to follow the British rental-cum-alliance model, and its credibility across Eurasia will decline rapidly.
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